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For more than two decades, Catherine Gallagher has been analysing the intricate relations 
between the rise of the novel, the concept of fictionality, and the status of the body – 
someone’s body or just nobody at all.1 In this new lecture, she adds to the already impressive 
body of knowledge her research has delivered.  
Simplifying matters to the extreme, one might say that Gallagher contends that novelistic 
fiction entails plausible narratives (as opposed to non-plausible forms of storytelling 
prevailing e.g. in ‘the scandalous libel and the allegorical romance’) and imaginary characters 
that belong to nobody and that thereby invite the reader to enter into a play of identification 
and distancing. This play is supposed to be a form of schooling in that it helps readers 
(especially female readers) to combine sympathy (cf. identification) with moral judgement 
(cf. distancing). Taking her cue from David Hume’s philosophy of sympathy, Gallagher says 
that this play is easier when no real persons are involved: fictional nobodies are easier to 
sympathize with, since they are easier to appropriate. Paradoxically, sympathy turns the other 
into the self and can thus be regarded as a form of egoism. To counter this self-absorption and 
thereby to facilitate the schooling process, the novel uses various distancing devices, 
including parody, satire and metafiction exposing the fictionality of the story. Gallagher 
shows that we are mistaken when we think that the early and realistic novels hide their 
fictionality. Among many other important contributions to our knowledge of the novel, she 
has done away with the cliché of the naïve realistic novel. 
While this is not the place to propose an extensive appreciation of Gallagher’s main ideas, 
a few questions might be in order. The first has to do with the somewhat vague notion of ‘the 
discovery of fiction’. In the recent study on The Novel (edited by Francesco Menotti) to which 
Gallagher refers in her talk, she published an important essay called ‘The Rise of 
Fictionality’. This intends to show that ‘the novel discovered fiction’, and that fiction, 
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consequently, is not a ‘transhistorical constant’.2 In the introduction to her lecture, she talks 
about her claim that ‘the novel, specifically, uncovered fictionality and required the 
articulation of its concept in the eighteenth century.’ The next paragraph says: ‘Fiction was 
thus discovered as a discursive mode’. The semantic difference between uncovering and 
discovering may be small, but it raises the question as to what extent the novel discovers 
something that was already there, waiting to be unveiled. Would it be wrong to say that the 
novel did not unveil a fiction in waiting, but that it constructed and invented some new form 
of fiction? Did it, perhaps, transform a concept that had been transformed continually ever 
since the Greek stories and novels? And if so, why would one be tempted to speak of a 
discovery? The notion of a discovery seems to cast aside the study of the process of continual 
transformation, and in so doing it may cause the notion of fiction to remain floating in the air. 
If, indeed, fiction is not a transhistorical constant, would it be possible to study it as a 
historical transformation rather than as a discovery? 
 My second question concerns the role of the reader. We see very little of the real reader in 
this lecture. He or she is approached as someone who has more or less the same ideas on 
sympathy as David Hume. Is it correct to use philosophical theories as a means to access the 
reactions of the readers? Are we to believe that Hume’s view is an accurate reflection of 
readerly dispositions and tendencies? On a philosophical level, one might just as well argue 
that nobodies make it difficult – rather than easy – to sympathize with them, since they have 
no clear form or character that might trigger sympathy. To get away from the abstract, 
philosophical level, one would have to look at concrete readerly reactions and testimonies. 
This would surely be a welcome addition to the speculative view on the reader 
propounded not just in the talk, but also in the ‘The Rise of Fictionality’. In the essay, 
Gallagher links the readerly attitude to the rise of modernity, saying e.g. that modernity 
‘encourages disbelief, speculation, and credit’.3 Still, most of the evidence on offer comes 
from metafictional statements in novels and from authorial comments. Gallagher even focuses 
on ‘the author’s intention to produce characters’, and she makes use of the ‘implied author’.4 
To me, both authorial intention and implied authors are highly debatable issues and not really 
arguments to bolster one’s case. Metafictional statements and authorial intrusions in fiction 
should not be taken at face value, and are no faithful reflection (or anticipation) of the readers’ 
reactions. A contextualized reception study might be in order here. This might complement 
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the view on female readers, which, in this lecture, is distilled only from textual clues and form 
contemporary philosophy. It may be true that these two textual sources give the impression 
that ‘the marriageable woman must practice putting the sympathetic machinery, as Hume 
described it, into reverse’, but it would be nice to see some substantiation for this claim 
coming from actual readers’ reactions.  
Perhaps this study of the actual reader might find some room for cognitive studies and for 
the Theory of Mind that have become increasingly important in the present-day study of 
fiction. It would be interesting to see how Gallagher’s ideas link up with these approaches. 
For instance, to Gallagher fiction implies the ‘imaginative appropriation of another’s point of 
view’. Can that be compared to the Theory of Mind, which states that we read fiction because 
it allows us to exercise one of our key capacities, namely our inclination to attribute mental 
activity, ‘mind’ to others.5 Reading fiction would be like exercises in reading minds. Is 
Gallagher’s suggestion a sort of experiential complement to that theory, focusing especially 
on emotions and moral sentiments, rather than on the whole cognitive world of a character? 
And if so, would this imply that emotional engagement with nobodies is part of a general 
attitude that is not restricted to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries?  Is the play of 
identification and distancing something which, like fiction, has always been around – and thus 
is not really discovered – but which, again like fiction, has continually been transformed?  
In the end, my two main questions come down to the same: they ask for a broader 
historical evolution and for a more particularized form of contextual embedding. It is certainly 
not my suggestion that these are absent from the work of Catherine Gallagher. Quite on the 
contrary, as her previous studies can testify. Still, I think that the abstract conceptualizing and 
the philosophical analysis of emotions must at any moment be complemented (or indeed: 
countered) by actual studies of readerly reactions and by historical studies of what came 
before and after. Otherwise we might end up with the illusion that we have discovered 
something new, whereas in fast we have covered the old and its manifold transformations.  
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